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The seizure by Somali pirates of the Saudi owned VLCC, the Sirius Star with its crew, in 
November 2008 captured international attention.  Across the world regular updates were 
given and the ransom demands discussed and debated in the press. Dramatic footage was 
shown on national television of the payment of the ransom by parachute and footage of the 
debacle which followed where some of the pirates were drowned. Until then, most of the 
non-shipping world thought of pirates as the romantic buccaneers aka Hollywood. However 
the cost to industry and its impact on international trade of piracy cannot be ignored. There 
are potential geopolitical repercussions. Despite international efforts, piracy in this region 
threatens to put a chokehold on one of the world’s busiest shipping arteries. Shipping lines 
are taking decisions to avoid the area and rerouting via the Cape of Good Hope. This paper 
attempts to measure the costs of piracy from the shipping company’s perspective by taking a 
comparative voyage costing approach. 
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Piracy is now a high-profile issue in international trade and transport. Despite international 
efforts, the age-old scourge of piracy is thriving with pirates terrorizing some of the world’s 
busiest shipping lanes. In the last ten years shipping companies have been subject to a steep 
rise in the number of pirate attacks on their vessels. These attacks have a direct impact on the 
cost of merchant shipping and thus indirectly on international trade and globalisation. 
Insurance premiums of ships travelling through pirate-infested waters have risen and that rise 
affects freight rates. These rises are ultimately passed on to businesses and consumers as 
increased costs. Every year hundreds of ships are attacked and the crew killed, injured, 
traumatised or taken hostage. Ransoms are paid and insurance premiums soar. The 
international response has been to send navies to protect merchant shipping and international 
trade. To avoid trouble spots owners may make a decision to divert vessels but this will not 
only add considerable operating expenses as fuel costs rise but the additional time spent in re-
routing vessels limits the number of voyages per year and thus revenue making opportunities.  
If piracy is not combated and continues to grow, it will have serious consequences for 
international transport and trade, affecting both developed and developing economies. 
 
The paper will firstly examine the growth in piracy in modern times and discuss some of the 
legal complexities facing the international community in trying to combat and obtain a 
prosecution for acts of piracy. The impact on international shipping and trade and the total 
cost worldwide of combating piracy has been difficult to estimate. This paper will use 
comparative voyage costing approach to show the financial impact of piracy on shipping 
lines which chose to re-route to avoid known pirate trouble spots.  
 
1.1 Pirate attacks in the 21
st
 century.  
The statistics are alarming.  
In 2008 there were 293 acts of piracy against ships, more than 11% up from the previous year 
where there were 263 incidents. In the first two months of 2009 there have been 26 more 
(IMB 2009a). Of the 293 pirate attacks in 2008, 49 vessels were hijacked, 889 crew taken 
hostage and a further 46 vessels fired upon. A total of 32 crew members injured, 11 killed 
and 21 missing presumed dead (IMB 2009b). These are the reported incidents. The IMB 
believes that actual pirate attacks could be possibly double those reported as many shipping 
lines prefer to cover losses out of their own resources rather than risk additional insurance 
costs. They fear as well, alarming customers, the time delay impacting on lost revenue 
potential and port costs of incurred while an investigation takes place.  
 
In 2008 there were 111 incidents reported to the IMB off the east coast of Somalia and in the 
Gulf of Aden, an increase of 200% over 2007 figures. The International Chamber of 
Shipping claims that pirates attack one ship in ten in the area, although most are 
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unsuccessful. The IMB is concerned that successful attacks are being carried out at greater 
distances from the land than in previous years. All types of vessels with varying freeboards 
and speeds were targeted. The pirates were better armed than in previous years and prepared 
to assault and injure the crew (IMB 2009b).   
 
The major areas for pirate attacks are The Gulf of Aden, near Somalia and the southern 
entrance to the Red Sea; The Gulf of Guinea, near Nigeria and the Niger River Delta; The 
Strait of Malacca between Indonesia and Malaysia, the Indian subcontinent, particularly 
between India and Sri Lanka and Central and South America (Hanson 2009; IMB 2009a). 
Shipping carries 90% of international commerce and as major shipping routes take cargo 
ships through narrow bodies of water such as the Strait of Malacca and the Gulf of Aden this 
provides an ideal opportunity for pirates to attack and board vessels using small high 
powered speed boats, often controlled by a mother ship (The Economist 2008 d and e). 
 
The attack on the Sirius Star, one of the largest oil tankers in the world, 450 nautical miles 
off the coast of Kenya on 15 November 2008 focused world attention on the issue.  It was the 
biggest ever “catch” by any pirate anywhere in the world, highlighting the vulnerability of 
even very large ships. The VLCC was carrying $110 million worth of oil. The ransom 
demanded initially was $30 million but when Resolution 1846
1
 was passed by the United 
Nations Security Council giving the international community more powers to apprehend 
pirates in Somali territorial waters, the pirates demand was reduced to $3 million and 
ultimately paid by a dramatic parachute drop, recorded on film and shown live over 
international television networks to a worldwide audience. However it must be remembered 
that there are still an estimated 300 crew from freighters and pleasure craft still being held 




1.2 Who are pirates and what constitutes an act of piracy? 
Piracy has always provided a good opportunity for ruthless men to seek their fortunes, 
experience the thrill of danger and engage in casual violence and cruelty (Cordingly 2006).  
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 Four Resolutions were passed during 2008 in an attempt to reduce the growing number of pirate attacks in the 
Gulf of Aden and give more legitimacy for the Navies operating in the area to protect vessels and apprehend 
pirates.  UN Resolution 1846, passed on 2 December 2008 permits States and regional organisations 
cooperating with the Somali Transitional Federal Government,(TFG) to enter Somali territorial waters and use 
“all necessary means” such as deploying naval vessels and military aircraft, as well as seizing and disposing of 
boats vessels, arms and related equipment used for piracy.......to fight piracy and armed robbery of the sea off 
the Somali coast, in accordance with relevant international law. 
2
 Pirates are demanding a $1.4 m ransom for two French nationals and their yacht seized in September and are 
still being held in Somali.  
4 
 
Etymological dictionaries trace the word pirate directly from the Latin, pirata but ultimately 
to Greek roots; Peirates, meaning “brigand”, and peira “to attempt, experience and find luck 
on the sea”. Acts of piracy have become part of folklore since antiquity as waterways, seas 
and oceans began to be used as trade routes. Pirates, robbed, maimed, killed and captured 
people for mercenary gain. In the 13
th
 Century BC the Sea Peoples were one of the first 
whose exploits were documented terrorising the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. The 
Phoenicians although great traders who were the victims of pirate attacks in the 
Mediterranean, at times resorted themselves to acts of piracy, capturing and trading in slaves. 
Julius Caesar in 78 BC was captured and ransomed by Cilician pirates as was St Patrick in 
5th century who was enslaved by Irish pirates. The stories of Viking raids plundering Britain, 
Ireland, Europe and Russia are renowned. Muslim pirates terrorized the Mediterranean 
towards the end of the 9
th
 century. Nor was piracy confined to known world of Western 
Europe and the Mediterranean. Pirates have operated in Eastern Europe, Africa, Asia and 
Polynesia throughout history. 
 
In recent times, the romantic notion of the privateer
3
, cutlasses, Jolly Rogers and walking the 
plank have been replaced by sophisticated operations with pirates using fast speed boats with 
the power to outrun most modern day freighters. Their vessels have the latest satellite 
communication and positioning systems. Pirates are armed with assault rifles, rocket 
launches and grenades. Captured vessels are typically held on average for three months 
before a ransom, which averages $1million, can secure the vessel and crew release (Costello 
2008). It is estimated that in 2008 Somali pirates had netted $120 million in ransom 
payments (Gettleman 2009). One of the biggest marine insurance payouts pay-outs was 
around $70m in an attack by pirates off Yemen in 2002 on the French tanker, the Limberg.  
One of the concerns of the international community are the links to armed Islamist groups. 
Ransoms are an ideal funding source for terrorists since the international banking system has 
tightened up
4
. There is however a distinction between acts of terrorism and piracy from a 
legal point of view with regard to rights of pursuit and penal sanctions which has created a 
problem for the international community’s attempt to protect international shipping. 
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 A privateer was an armed vessel sanctioned by a State and authorised to capture the merchant vessel of a 
hostile nation. Privateering invariably flourished during time of war but degenerated into piracy when peace 
was declared. (David Cordingly 2006).  
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 The MV Faina, a Ukrainian freighter was captured in September 2008 with  a cargo of Soviet-era tanks and 
other heavy weapons bound for Southern Sudan with the connivance of the Kenyan government (The 





1.3 Legal definition, issues and problems 
The term “piracy” was defined by the Geneva Convention on the High Seas in 1958 and was 
adopted by the UN 1982 Convention. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) states in Article 101 that piracy consists of any illegal acts of violence, or 
detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the 
passengers of a private ship or private aircraft that is directed on the high seas against another 
ship, aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft. It specifically 
states that the act can occur outside the jurisdiction of any state and includes any act of 
voluntary participation and any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act of piracy.  
For acts of violence against ships, persons, or property on board to be classified as piracy the 
following conditions must all be met simultaneously: The act of violence must be committed 
by the crew or passengers of another vessel, is illegal and serve private purposes and it must 
be committed on the high seas or at a place not subject to state sovereignty (House of 
Commons 2006; IMO 2000). 
 
Although appearing quite comprehensive, there are legal issues which have limited the 
enforcement of the Convention. For example Article 101 does not include politically 
motivated acts, such as terrorist attacks which in more recent times have become blurred. 
Many believe that the sophistication of more recent attacks demonstrates the links to al 
Queda. The Institute for South East Asian Studies, ISEAS, report that it is al-Qaeda intention 
to disrupt maritime trade, targeting especially industrialised countries dependence on oil. 
Particularly of concern is the potential for the Straits of Malacca or the Suez to be blocked 
which would force forcing costly diversions and add to world commodity prices. Intelligence 
reports show that al-Qaeda has its own naval manual with entries showing which points to 
target on a vessel, how to attach limpet mines, how to fire rockets from a speedboat travelling 
at high speed and how to transform gas tankers into flowing bombs (Munich Re 2006).  
Pirates have provided training to the maritime wing of al-Shabaab, and al-Shabaab is using 
some pirate groups for arms smuggling (Schiemsky 2008) 
 
The definition of what is meant by “illegal” has led to debate in Court under whose law the 
act of piracy should  be considered. Should it be judged from the perspective of international 
law or national law in the prosecuting countries? Should it be under civil or penal code?  The 
problem is exacerbated as every legal system has its own definition of the act of piracy. 
Another shortcoming is that 80% of all attacks occur in territorial waters and in ports and 
thus do not qualify as piracy under the UN 1982 Convention which limits the offence to the 
high seas. However the 2008 UN Resolution, although specifically aimed at the problem in 
Somali, does give some precedence to apprehend pirates in a State’s territorial waters.   
 
The complexity of the legal situation and the problem of obtaining a conviction can be best 
illustrated with the following case example. 
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A vessel flying a Panamanian flag is carrying a shipment from Japan. The cargo is 
insured in Germany, the crew comes from the Philippines and the Netherlands. The 




1.4 Measuring the costs of piracy. 
There is no quantitative research available on the total cost of piracy (Hanson 2009), nor any 
reliable figures documenting the economic consequences (Munich Re 2006). Estimates vary 
widely because of disagreement as to how to measure the costs of piracy. What variables 
should be included?  Are insurance risk premiums, ransoms and the costs of negotiation 
including the time factors the key variables? What about the impact on world trade and value 
put on the human the trauma suffered by crew and family? Should the cost of the combined 
international force of navy ships patrolling the Gulf also be factored in?  
 
Published estimates vary between $1 billion to $16 billion a year (Hanson 2009; Bone 2008) 
with most commentators agreeing it is extremely difficult to estimate. Others warn against 
exaggerating the current threat posed by modern day pirates. Some experts argue that even if 
the costs are $16 billion pa this should be put into perspective as it is a very small proportion 
of total value of world commerce which is in the order of trillions of dollars per annum 
(Hanson, 2009). However there is no doubt that there is growing concern in the international 
community because of the scale of attacks and the size of the vessels now being targeted.  In 
2007 for instance 6,500 tankers carrying 7% of the world’s oil used the Suez Canal route 
(Miller 2008). Others warn that there are possible links to terrorists. They are concerned that 
if the Suez Canal was blocked by a terrorist act that this would choke off 11% of world trade. 
Another fear is the possibility of an environmental disaster involving a large VLCC
6
 which 




One measure of the cost of piracy could be from the point of view of the Suez Canal 
Authority. As ships avoid the region their revenue has fallen. Under normal operating 
conditions around 20,000 vessels transit the Canal annually.  The company has reported that 
piracy in the Gulf of Aden/Somali has reduced Canal traffic by 45% to 50% on normal 
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 See discussion in (Munich Re  2006). 
6
 There is fear that there could be a repeat of a pirate hijacking incident in the Malacca Strait. In 1992 a collision 
occurred between the containership ”Ocean Blessing” and a hijacked tanker “Nagasaki  Spirit“ taking the lives 
of all but two of both ship’s crew. Pirates boarded the tanker, imprisoned the crew and set the auto pilot at full 
speed.  The fire lasted for six days on tanker and six weeks on the container ship.  (Law Lords 1997).  
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 In late September2008 an Iranian ship on route from China was boarded by pirates. Some pirates died while 




volumes. On a daily basis volumes are about 70 to 80 vessels northbound and southbound 
and now only half that are using the Canal due to the present problems (Ostler 2009).  If we 
look at for example at container vessels, 26.5% of all international container traffic passed 
through the Suez Canal carrying 20.5million TEUs in 2007 (Fetouh 2008).  Larger container 
vessels incur a transit fee about $600,000 so any drop in the volume of ships has an 
immediate impact on the Suez Canal Authority’s bottom line and implications for foreign 
exchange earnings of the Egyptian Government.  As a direct result of this drop in volume, 
Canal rate rises scheduled for 2009 have been shelved and a fall in dues is being 
contemplated. 
 
Many shipping companies are now prepared to re-route via the Cape of Good Hope, despite 
that this will add thousands of miles to the journey.  Table 1 shows the savings of the Suez 
route in nautical miles and as a percentage of the total voyage for selected port pairs. 
 





Suez Canal CAPE NM % 
Ras Tanura  
  
Constantza 4,144 12,094 7,950 66 
Lavera 4,684 10,783 6,099 57 
Rotterdam 6,436 11,169 4,733 42 
New York 8,281 11,794 3,513 30 
Jeddah Piraeus 1,320 11,207 9,887 88 
 Liverpool  3,902 10,702 6,800 63.5 
 Rotterdam 6,337 10,743 4,406 41 
Bombay Rotterdam 6,337 10,743 4,406 41 
 Marseille  4,558 10,362 5,804 56 
Tokyo Rotterdam 11,192 14,507 3,315 23 
Shanghai  Genoa  8,670 13,619 4,947 36.3 
Singapore Rotterdam 8,288 11,755 3,647 29 
         Source: Derived from information provided by the Suez Canal Authority 
           
CMA CGM who operate one of the world’s largest container fleets has announced its 
intention to divert some of their services via the Cape (Porter 2009). MSC has also 
announced its intention to take the longer route via the Cape and Maersk has already done so 
for some of it container services (Lloyd List DCN 2009a; Port Strategy 2009).  Frontline, the 
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world’s largest operator of supertankers, said after the hijacking of the Saudi VLCC, Sirius 
Star, that they would consider diverting vessels (Abdul Bashi 2008). Odfjell SE, a Norwegian 
company with 100 chemical tankers has begun diverting its vessels around Africa at an extra 
cost of $30,000 per day, even though the route adds five days on a run from Asia and ten 
days from the Middle East (Miller 2008). MOL is now diverting some of its pure car and 
truck carriers around Africa and the Grand Alliance – Hapag-Lloyd, NYK, OOCL and MISC 
would reroute their eastbound EU3 sailings to void Suez (Lloyds List DCN b). 
Diverting vessels around the Cape of Good Hope will add thousands of nautical miles to 
many trades and thus this decision needs to be quantified by determining the net benefit or 
cost to the shipping line.  This is a measure of the cost of piracy from a ship operator’s 
perspective and it is this measure that will be pursued in this paper. In Section 2 the model is 
explained and comparative cost component values determined to be used in Section 3 to 
calculate the costs of piracy.  Section 4 concludes the paper.   
 
 
2. MODEL AND COST COMPONENTS 
Ship operators are assumed to maximise profit - voyage revenue less costs so 
P = R – C      (1)   
where      P = profits 
R = revenue 
C = costs 
 
On the revenue side,     R = f (V, r)      (2) 
where               V = cargo carrying capacity 
      r = freight rate 
 
Ceteris paribus freight rates, r, in this analysis are considered given and independent of the 
route, as freight rates reflect competitive market conditions. Similarly, the cargo carrying 
capacity per voyage, V, is taken as given as it will not vary with route chosen. On these 
grounds there is no need to consider the revenue function further so attention will be focused 
on costs.  The costs considered will be those that vary directly with the route chosen ie the 
voyage costs, VC, while those costs associated with stevedoring, port and light dues, wharfage 
at the loading and destination ports will be considered constant and will not enter into the 




VC =  f  (N, F,CSC,,T)      (3) 
where       N = nautical miles 
       F = fuel cost / voyage 
     CSC= Suez Canal transit costs  
        T = Time period 
To measure the cost of piracy for the ship operator only those operating costs and overheads 
such as insurance which alter when the longer route via the Cape of Good Hope is 
undertaken ie the incremental voyage costs, ∆CV, are relevant, The most important component 
of these costs is the change in fuel cost, as the route via the Cape adds significant number of 
nautical miles to the voyage. However there are offsetting cost adjustments which need to be 
made if the Suez route is used. The Suez Canal rates for pilotage and to transit the Canal both 
southbound and northbound are considerable. As well, the Gulf of Aden is now being 
considered as a zone of extreme danger and as such an insurance risk premium is being 
applied. Crew now receive a wage supplementation whilst travelling through the region
8
. 
Time charter rates per day are a measure of capital, crew, maintenance costs etc of operating 
the ship. As voyage length varies so too will the number of days to complete a round voyage. 
This variable will be taken up later and is not included at this stage in (4). Thus  
    
    ∆CV  =  (FC - FS)  -  (SCR + I + WS)    (4) 
where    ∆CV  =  incremental cost per round voyage 
       FC  =   Fuel costs via Cape of Good Hope 
       FS  =   Fuel costs via Suez 
    SCR  =  Suez Canal transit rates, north and southbound 
        I   =  Insurance risk premium for Suez north and southbound 
     WS    =  Wage supplementation for Suez north and southbound 
 
Two vessel types were chosen for the analysis, a tanker and a large container ship.  For the 
purposes of the comparative study a VLCC with similar size, engine power and speed as the 
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 Peter Bond GM of Cyprus based Interoient Line Services reports that the company pays its crews double for 
every day spent in the Gulf of Aden. They are also considering hiring licensed security guards, costing $60, 000 
per trip to protect the crew (Miller 2008). 
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Sirius Star was chosen as this size of vessel has already been targeted by pirates.  A 10,020 
TEU container ship was chosen as decisions have already been made by the major container 
operators to divert their larger container vessels around the Cape, avoiding the Suez Canal. 
Table 2 lists ship characteristics of both vessels used in the analysis. 
 
Table 2   Ship characteristics 
 VLCC   Container Vessel  
Tonnage 162,252 GT 147,716 tons displacement 
DWT/TEUs 318,000 DWT 10,040 
NRT 111,896 tons 54,951tons 
Length 332m 349m 
Breadth 58m 45.66m 
Draft 22m 27.3m 
Main Engines  Man 6S90 M-C Man 12K98ME 
Power output 29,340 kw 68,640 kw 
Service Speed 16.2 knots 25.8 knots 
Source: Lloyds Register of Shipping.       
 
To avoid being confounded by extraneous variables, voyages were assumed between port 
pairs with no other port calls. The tanker port pairs are the oil port of Mena al Ahmedi in 
Kuwait and Rotterdam in Europe and for the container ship, the trade route Singapore to 
Rotterdam, The comparative distance, sea time per round trip for the route by Suez and via 
the Cape of Good Hope are presented in Table 3 for the VLCC and for the 10,040 TEU 
container ship in Table 4 The sea time for a single leg was calculated for each route using the 
manufacturer’s stated service speed.  To calculate the round voyage time, port and transit 
times for the Suez Canal were added. Four decimal places are used throughout the analysis 
until the final calculations of the cost of piracy to minimise rounding errors. To allow for 
loading, discharging, tide and other factors two days at each end of the route were assumed. 






Table 3  VLCC round voyage 
Mena al Ahmedi to Rotterdam Via Suez Via Cape 
Distance in NM 6,577 11,369 
Round Voyage in days 39.8248 62.4826 
Source:  Reeds Marine Distance Tables 
 
Table 4  Container ship round voyage 
Singapore to Rotterdam Via Suez Via Cape 
Distance in NM 8,308 11,850 
Round Voyage in days 32.8346 42.2752 
Source:  Reeds Marine Distance Tables 
 
To determine the fuel cost per annum we need to return to (3). F, fuel cost for the voyage, is 
a function of the length of a sea-time round voyage in days, the specific fuel consumption in 
tonnes per day and the price of bunkers. The power of the engine and the consumption in 
grams per kilowatt for the manufacturer’s stated service speed of the vessel are used to 
determine the fuel consumption in tonnes per day. This value was calculated for both vessels 
and is the second item in Tables 5 and 6.  Fuel consumption for the VLCC is 117.5847 tons 
per day and 280.0512 tons per day for the container vessel. The use of ancillary engines and 
fuel consumption while in port do not form part of the analysis as these costs would be 
constant across routes. If T, the time period, is a year then the number of voyages completed 
in the year equals the length of each round voyage including sea-time, port and canal transit 
times, in the case of the Suez route, divided into 365 days. Bunker cost was based on 380cst 
marine fuel oil @ $260/t. The specific fuel consumption of each vessel in tonnes was 
calculated on a hourly then daily basis and was found to 117.5947 t/day for the VLCC and 
280.0512 t/day for the container ship
9
. The fuel consumption per round voyage was based on 
the sea-time length of each round voyage. These values were used to find the total fuel cost 
per annum for both the tanker and container vessel on Suez and Cape routes, the last item in 
Tables, 5 and 6.   
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 For more detail on fuel consumption calculations see  (H.B.Bendall  1979). 
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Table 5 VLCC sea-time fuel costs pa. 
Mena al Ahmedi to Rotterdam Via Suez Via Cape 
Sea-time per round voyage 33.8248 58.4826 
Fuel Consumption t/d 117.5947 117.5947 
Fuel Consumption t /r v 3,774.6684 6,526.3482 
No of round voyages pa 9.1651 5.8416 
Fuel Oil* Cost $s per year $9,478,367.47 $10,445,267.92 
Source*: $260/t (Clarkson 2009). 
 
Table 6 Container ship sea-time fuel costs pa. 
Singapore to Rotterdam Via Suez Via Cape 
Sea-time days per round 
voyage 
26.8346 38.2752 
Fuel Consumption t/d 280.0512 280.0512 
Fuel Consumption t /r v 7,515.0619 10,719.0157 
No of round voyages pa 11.1163 8.6339 
Fuel Oil* Cost $s per year 21,720,317.48 24,062196.51 
Source*: $260/t (Clarkson 2009). 
 
2.1 Opportunity Cost of Diversion for a Constant Freight Task 
 
As the voyage around the Cape adds considerably to the length of the voyage, fewer voyages 
have been shown to be completed in a given time period, T, one year.  Ships on this route 
have lower productivity as they carry less cargo volumes each year. Thus there is an 
opportunity cost of diversion, COC, which is a function of the number of lost voyages per 
period when the Cape route is taken.  For a comparative route costing analysis, the freight 
task, ie the amount of cargo carried by the ship on each route, should be constant to ensure 
that the revenue function, R, described in (2) remains a constant
10
.  To isolate the additional 
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 An assumption is made that customers will not demand a lower freight rate for slower delivery of goods. 
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costs of the fall in productivity of the vessel as a result of the “lost” voyages per period and 
still hold the revenue function constant, two approaches can be taken. In the first approach 
the shipowner would need to charter-in an extra vessel to carry the shortfall in the freight 
task. The charter cost of the vessel would need to be included. In the second approach the 
shipowner would need to extend the number of voyages of the same vessel and the cost of 
these voyages would also need to be factored in. Ceteris paribus, both approaches are a 
measure of the opportunity cost of diversion, however in the first, T remains a constant but in 
the second T, becomes a variable. It is the second approach that will be undertaken in this 
analysis. If H is the constant freight task ie the cargo commitment to clients, is taken to be the 
volume of cargo carried by the vessel using the shorter Suez route over a year, the diversion 
cost of carrying H, including opportunity cost, equals the cost of  piracy, CP.  In (4) the 
incremental costs of diversion were identified as the differential in fuel costs between the two 
routes, offset by the costs of canal transit. The cost of piracy will include these factors but as 
well, an opportunity cost, COC. 
 
 
2.1.1 The Elements of the Opportunity Cost 
 
Ships are expensive assets. A charge or opportunity cost should be included to reflect the 
additional time/capital costs necessary to complete H. Time charter rates per day will be used 
for this purpose and are denoted as ∆CCH. Time charters also cover crew costs over the 
period
11
.  The additional voyages around the Cape will incur fuel costs, ∆CFH , additional 
Protection and Indemnity, P & I, insurance cover ∆CIH  and additional port visit costs, ∆CPH.  
If H is the constant freight task then the opportunity cost, COC, equals 
 
 COC  = ∆(CCH + CFH + CIH + CPH)     (5) 
where   ∆CCH =  incremental charter cost to fulfil H 
  ∆CFH =  incremental fuel cost to fulfil H 
  ∆CIH  =  incremental insurance cost to fulfil H 
∆CPH  =  incremental port costs to fulfil H     
 
The opportunity cost, COC is now incorporated into the model to form (6) 
 
CP =   (FC - FS)  +  (SCR + I + WS) + COC    (6) 
  
The cost of piracy, CP. equals the differential in voyage fuel costs over the given time T, the 
first term on the right hand side, minus the savings in costs associated with using the Suez 
route to carry H ie Suez rates, insurance risk premium and wage supplements for “war zone” 
transit, the second item on the right hand side, plus the costs associated with the extra 
voyages to ensure a constant freight task H.  
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 If a shipowner chooses not to extend the number of voyages but completes the freight task in time T, an extra 





It is assumed that the tanker will carry its full deadweight load of 318,000 tons per voyage. A 
payload of 0.8 however is assumed for the container vessel as actual container carrying 
capacity is usually lower that the stated number of TEUs provided by the builder and equals 
8,032 TEUs per single voyage. Via Suez, the VLCC will complete 9.1651 round voyages and 
thus over the period of a year will carry 2,914,501 tons.  The container vessel over the same 
period will complete 11.1163 round voyages and carry 178,572.2432 TEUs. Again four 
decimals places are preserved to avoid rounding inconsistencies until the final analysis. The 
cargo carrying capacity of both vessels over the year via Suez sets the base for the given 
freight task, H.  If the VLCC has been routed via the Cape to avoid the pirates in the Gulf 
then 3.3235 additional voyages must be made to complete H. Similarly the large container 
vessel will have to complete an additional 2.4824 voyages. (COC), the opportunity cost of this 
additional freight task, can now be estimated and used in (6).  Fuel costs for round voyage 
only relate to sea-time for both the first item on the right hand side of equation (6) and for the 
opportunity cost of fuel to complete the additional voyages.  Charter costs were supplied by a 
shipbroker as of the 23 February 2009. Insurance costs for ships of similar size were obtained 
from industry sources for vessels using the Suez and those avoiding the Gulf of Aden. The 
opportunity cost components relating to fuel and charter costs were calculated and the results 
presented in Tables 7 and 8. Other opportunity cost factors such as harbour and light dues for 
additional port visits, although identified to complete the diversion cost model, are minor and 
are not included in the analysis. Terminal fees for loading and discharging relate to cargo 
volumes. As the freight task is constant then the route is immaterial to the cargo volumes 
carried. As cargo is constant, terminal costs do not form part of the opportunity costs of 
diversion.  
 
Table 7 Opportunity cost (fuel) to complete freight task. 
 VLCC Container Ship 
Additional voyages to complete H 3.3235 2.4824 
Round sea voyage days- via Cape 58.4826 38.2752 
Fuel consumption t/day 117.5947 280.0512 
Bunker cost 380cst* $260 $260 
Additional fuel cost to complete H $5,942,695.14 $ 6,918,309.98 






Table 8 Opportunity cost (charter) to complete freight task. 
 VLCC Container Ship 
Additional voyages to complete H 3.3235 2.4824 
Voyage sea-days around Cape 62.4826 42.2752 
Charter Cost /day $40,000 $17,500 
Additional charter cost to complete H $8,306,436,84 $1,836,519.24 
 
The Suez Canal Authority Rates were obtained for northbound and sound bound transits for 
both the 318,000 dwt VLCC and 10,040 TEU container vessel. The VLCC southbound 
voyage would be in ballast so canal transit rates are lower for this leg. There is only a slight 
difference between north and southbound rates for the container vessel. Suez rates are 
$624,304.66 /round voyage for the VLCC and $547,885.31 for the container vessel. These 
rates were applied to each round voyage to complete the freight task H in one year time 
period and are $5,721,814.33 for the VLCC and $6,090,457.51 for the containership. The 
results are presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9 Suez Canal transit costs. 
 VLCC Container Ship 
North bound 345,464.786 274,189.6565 
South bound 278,839.874 273,695.6565 
Total in USD 624,304.626 547,885.3130 
No of voyages/year 9.1651 11.1163 
Cost to complete cargo task $5,721,814,32 $6,090,375.26 
 
There is currently a wage supplement paid to crew while transiting the region. As this crew 
payment is only for approximately a week per voyage and varies with crew nationality, the 
bonus is relatively minor in perspective to other Suez costs and is not included in the costing. 
 
The Suez insurance risk premium for P&I cover was based on the number of transits of the 
Suez Canal necessary to complete H.  The risk premium rate for the Suez route is quite 
substantial due to the spate of pirate attacks on larger and larger vessels in recent times and 
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has certainly been a major factor along with hefty Suez Canal rates in the decision by 
shipping lines to divert to the Cape route. Although insurance rates will vary with the size 
and composition of the shipowner’s fleet, estimates obtained for P&I insurance of vessels of 
similar size to those in the study indicate that the risk premium per transit of Suez is 
extremely high. For example a rate of 0.1% of the ship value was applied to each Suez transit 
in addition to an annual rate of 0.15%
12
.  The insurance risk premium for each transit of the 
Suez was $130,000 for the VLCC and $100,000 for the container ship, based on ship values 
supplied by Clarkson (2009). These transit insurance costs were applied to the number of 
voyages per year via Suez for each vessel. The insurance opportunity cost component was 
found by apportioning the number of extra days necessary to complete H as a percentage of 
the annual insurance P&I rate.  Using the model outlined in (6) the cost of piracy for the 
VLCC is $7,222,234.24 per annum and $2,842,735,82 a year for the container vessel, shown 
in Tables 10 and 11.  The diversion cost is significant for both vessel.  
 
Table 10  Cost of piracy - VLCC 
VLCC USD 
Additional Fuel Costs   Cape  966,900.45 
Opportunity Cost of H Fuel 5,942,695.14 
 Charter 8,306,436.84 
 Insurance 110,942.14 
Savings via Suez Canal   Suez Canal dues 5,721,814.33 
 Insurance risk premium 2,382,926.00 






                                                 
12
  Marcus John, CEO Thomas Miller , Australia  26 February 2009.. 
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Table 11 Cost of piracy – Container ship 
Container Ship USD 
Additional Fuel Costs   Cape  2,358,600.70 
Opportunity Cost of H  Fuel 6,918.309.98 
 Charter 1,836,519.24 
 Insurance 43,023.41 
Savings via Suez Canal   Suez Canal dues 6,090,457.51 
 Insurance risk premium 2,223,260.00 
Cost of Piracy $2,842,735.82 
 
If piracy remains unabated in the region and ships are forced to re-route on a more permanent 
basis then the comparative voyage costing approach could be expanded to include a 
discounted cash flow analysis, DCF, in order to measure the impact of diversion over time on 
the value of the shipping company. This is an area for future research. 
 
On a purely cost basis, why then are shipping companies choosing to re-route via the Cape?   
It has been demonstrated there are significant savings from avoiding Suez Canal transit fees 
and the hefty risk premium insurance for ships travelling through the Gulf of Aden but the 
additional fuel costs of the longer voyage are not the only consideration. The savings 
generated have been shown to be insufficient to offset the considerable opportunity cost of 
the longer voyage. However, in today’s economic climate the shipping industry is 
experiencing a downturn with economic activity depressed worldwide. It is reported that over 
453 container ships, 10.7% of world fleet (Lloyds List 2009c) have been laid up, including 
new builds which are yet to see service. The depressed demand is reflected in the lower 
charter rate of $17,500 / day for a new 10,040 TEU vessel used in the analysis to determine 
the opportunity costs of the additional voyages.  Had the current market for box ships been 
more buoyant, the time charter rate would be more reflective of the capital cost of the new 
vessel. In this was the case, the cost of piracy for the container ship operator would have been 
more marked. Shipping lines with advertised port service commitments are using the 
opportunity to employ vessels which may otherwise be laid up to maintain their scheduled 
port visits. By doing so, shipping companies do not have to cut the service to their customers, 
nor have to charter-in additional tonnage to compensate for slower steaming times on the 
longer route. The opportunity cost component is thus reduced but this savings in charter costs 





Maritime piracy has been on the rise for a number of years. Pirates have become more 
sophisticated and are targeting larger and larger vessels. Recently the spate of pirate attacks 
in the Gulf of Aden near Somalia and the southern entrance to the Red Sea, including the 
ransom of largest ship ever, the VLCC Sirius Star in November 2008 has focused world 
attention on the issue. Insurance premiums for transit of the region have soared to a point 
where annual P&I insurance rates are similar to the risk premium applied to a single voyage. 
Ships can avoid the region by re-routing via the Cape of Good Hope. However this diversion 
may add considerable distance to any trade route. For the ships and trade analysed, diversion 
added 74% to length of the voyage from Kuwait to Rotterdam in the case of the tanker and 
44% for the container vessel in the Singapore to Rotterdam route. The cost of diversion is the 
cost of piracy from the shipowner’s point of view. A comparative voyage costing approach 
was undertaken. By analysing a constant freight task, defined as the amount of cargo carried 
in a year via Suez, the study found that re-routing added a considerable cost penalty. Millions 
of dollars were added to fuel bills and the longer route incurred an opportunity cost of less 
voyages in a given time period to carry the same amount of cargo as through the Suez. 
However the cost of diversion, and thus the cost of piracy, would be greater if there were no 
substantial incentives to avoid the area. Insurance risk premiums and canal transit fees offset 
to a great extent the additional fuel and opportunity costs, reducing the cost of piracy to the 
shipowner. Nevertheless, there is a net cost. Piracy is adding millions of dollars per year to 
shipwowners’ costs each year when opportunity costs are factored in. If piracy is not 
combated and continues to grow, it will have serious consequences for international transport 
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